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Peel: The Expanding Scope of Liability in the Home Construction Enterpr

THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF LIABILITY
IN THE HOME CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISE
INTRODUCTION

The law fails in many respects to keep abreast of the
necessary changes and needs confronting a rapidly expanding
and sophisticated society. This is probably the reason for
the uncertainty in the law which developed in the area of
residential tract developments. The old common law doctrines developed in England and adopted by the United
States were based on strict property law concepts which were
applicable for that day and age. The post World War II
era stimulated an almost assembly line, large scale production
of residential homes. The old property law doctrines and
concepts failed to meet the problems created by this rapid
expansion of residential homes. The courts continued to
apply such doctrines as caveat emptor, merger, and lack of
privity of contract thus preventing the inexperienced, unsophisticated home purchaser from recovering damages
caused by his vendor-builder, contractor or even architect.
The results were in effect to disregard all concepts of risk
allocation, equality of bargaining and duty owed to the public. In other words, most courts continued to follow the doctrine of stare decisis and left matters to the legislature if
changes were to be made in the future.
Some courts recognized the fact that the various doctrines and concepts currently being employed by the courts
were outdated and did not meet the problems confronting
the home purchaser. These courts changed the outmoded
views of liability in this area of the law by modifying, overruling and creating new concepts and doctrines. The total
effect of this procedure was to update the law so as to meet
the needs of our time. This procedure of updating the law
is in conformity with the opinions of many legal scholars
and is aptly expressed by Justice Cardozo who stated, "A
rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, and was supposed in the making to express the mores
Copyright@ 1970 by the University of Wyoming
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of the day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores have
so changed that perpetuation of the rule would do violence
to the social conscience."'
The process of updating the law is gradual and difficult
since without congressional legislation the individual states
interpret and apply the law as they see fit. This creates a
lack of uniformity of the law among the states which leaves
the door open to many unanswered questions. These questions are numerous, varied and their scope of inquiry results
in a substantial range of legal consequences. These questions might range from the appropriate remedial doctrines
and concepts available to the home purchaser to the limits
and scope of liability of appropriate parties to the action.
These questions which arise in the home construction field
are troublesome and difficult to answer. The predictability
of the law in this area is presently uncertain, but the direction of development toward broadening the scope of liability
seems apparent. The following study of the cases, doctrines
and concepts will state the current status of the law in the
home construction field and indicate the possible course the
law will follow in expanding the scope of liability for defectively constructed homes.
CAVEAT EMPToR-AN OUTDATED DEFENSE

Both American and English law have almost entirely
abolished the doctrine of caveat emptor in regard to the sale
of chattels.2 This doctrine has not been abolished in the area
of real estate and some states still regard it as being in full
force.3 In 1958, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the
doctrine applies to the sale of an existing home and there are
no implied warranties in a contract for the sale of real property.4 In 1963, the Georgia court in Walton v. Petty5 enunciated a similar view stating that there being no implied warranties as to the condition of the house, the rule of caveat
emptor applies. The court based its reasoning on the propo1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

B. CARDoZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 137 (1924).
PnossER, TORTS § 83, at 491 (2d ed. 1955).
Walton v. Petty, 107 Ga. App. 753, 131 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1963).
Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978, 983 (1959).
Walton v. Petty, supra note 3.
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sition that the vendee could adequately protect himself by
an expressed covenant in his deed. The court further stated
that as a general rule no remedies are available for any
breach by the vendor of any promise in the sales contract
if omitted in the deed, since the two merge upon acceptance
of the conveyance by the purchaser.' The concept of merger
has been applied by many courts in the United States as a
basis for their distinction in finding no implied warranty of
fitness for habitation in completed homes as compared to
unfinished homes. Once the purchaser accepts the deed, the
sales contract and deed merge thus absolving the vendorbuilder of further responsibility for covenants of title not
included. The concept of merger is premised upon arm's
length bargaining potential by people capable of examining
the purchased house with reasonable expertise.' Some courts
have not accepted the fact that the average home purchaser
does not possess the expertise necessary to reasonably inspect
the home. This was illustrated by the Indiana Appellate
Court's decision which stated that since the vendee and the
vendor dealt at arm's length the purchaser has no right to
rely upon the representations of the vendor as to the house's
quality, when he has had reasonable opportunity to examine
the property.8 The merger concept would have soundness
in a non complex society and where the home is easily examinable, but today with the tremendous increase in tract developments, the buyer no longer stands on equal footing with
the builder. The sophistication of the tract developer is far
superior to that of the average home purchaser who is unable
to protect himself from the unscrupuolus developer.
Although some states reluctantly refuse to abrogate the
doctrine of caveat emptor because of stare decisis or unrealistic property law concepts which are outmoded as to the
times, a contrary course has been recognized by many courts
in the United States. The current development of the law
has been expressed in a recent 1968 Maryland decision involving an action by the purchaser of a house against the yen6. Id.
7. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The House Merchant Did
It, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 835, 857 (1967).
8. Tudor v. Heugel, 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442, 444 (1961).
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dor to recover damages caused by the basement subsequently
flooding. In Allen v. Wilkinson,' the Maryland Court of
Appeals recognized the "trend in some courts to find that an
implied warranty exists where houses are mass produced
and sold to individual purchasers by a builder-developer."
The court further recognized the merits in such a view but
refused to follow the trend leaving any changes to be made
by the Maryland state legislature. It should be noted that
when the courts applied the doctrine of caveat emptor basing
their rationale on the fact that the purchaser could either
obtain an express warranty or examine the premises independently, it was limited to the purchase and sale of completed
homes. The courts did not invoke the doctrine or its rationale
for unfinished homes but instead allowed recovery based on
an implied warranty theory. This theory of recovery did
not impose upon the builder an obligation to deliver a perfect
house but entitled the purchaser to rescission and restitution
for major defects which rendered the house unfit for habitation and which are not readily remediable. ° The first case
which established the implied warranty theory as a basis
for recovery because of a defectively constructed home which
was unfinished at the time of purchase was Vanderschrier v.
Aaron." The Ohio Court of Appeals refusing to discuss the
legal question involved in the sale of completed homes proceeded to hold that the purchaser of an unfinished home has
an implied warranty from the vendor-builder that it will be
completed in a reasonable efficient workmanlike manner."2
This theory of recovery was subsequently upheld in the states
of Washington," Oklahoma' and Illinois. 5
The distinction between allowing recovery based on an
implied warranty for unfinished homes and denying recovery
with respect to the purchase of completed homes was finally
abrogated by the Supreme Court of Colorado."6 The Colo9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515, 517 (1968).
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
Id. at 821.
Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474, 477 (1958).
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158, 160 (Okla. 1963).
Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co., 36 Ill. App.2d 383, 184 N.E.2d
728, 734 (1962).
16. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154. Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964).
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rado Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Donohoe" stated that
purchaser of a nearly completed home could rely on an
implied warranty whereas a purchaser of a completed home
could not is a distinction without reasonable basis for it. The
court went on to hold that the implied warranty of fitness
of the home to be constructed in a workmanlike manner and
suitable for habitation applies to finished homes as well as
unfinished homes. Two years later in 1968, the Supreme
Court of Idaho in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel'8 in accordance with
the flow of judicial opinion, upheld the doctrine of implied
warranty of fitness in cases involving the sale of new homes
by builders. The court stated that "the old rule of caveat
emptor does not satisfy the demands of justice in such
cases . . . To apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business of building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial of justice."' 9 The Texas Supreme Court in
Humber v. Morton" likewise recognized that the doctrine
of caveat emptor has no application to the sale of a new house
by a builder-vendor. The court based its reasoning on the
assumption that the rule of caveat emptor is patently out
of harmony with modern home buying practices. The Supreme Court of Washington in July of 1969 stated that the
present trend is toward the implied warranty of fitness and
away from caveat emptor when it comes to fitness and habitation of the newly purchased home.2 The developing direction of the law toward allowing recovery for property damage caused by a defectively constructed home when based on
an implied warranty of fitness for habitation seems well
founded and essential to meet our current social needs.
The cases presented thus far have applied contractual
law and theory to find liability on the part of vendor-builders for the construction of a defective home. The doctrine
of caveat emptor has steadily deteriorated to the point where
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, supra note 10, at 710.
Id.
426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
House v. Thornton, __ Wash. __, 457 P.2d 199, 203 (1969).
See also
Wawak v. Stewart, --- Ark -... 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970) ; Rothberg v. Olenik,
Vt - ---262 A.2d 461 (1970).
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the legal course is decisively against its application to the
purchase and sale of residential homes. The doctrine of
implied warranty has emerged and expanded to protect the
unsophisticated home purchaser from bearing the risk and
financial loss incurred from the purchase of a defectively
constructed home regardless of being unfinished or completed
at the time of purchase. Although some courts seem to distinguish liability on the basis of whether the developer is a
mass producer or a single home builder, the direction of
future decisions seems apparent that liability will be imposed
on any residential home builder that causes property damage
to the purchaser based on the theory of implied warranty
of fitness and habitation.
THE MACPHERSON DOCTRINE-AN EXPANDING REMEDY

A purchaser of a new home who suffered personal injury
as compared to property damage because of its faulty construction had no recourse against the builder-vendor in
the early nineteen hundreds. This was clearly illustrated
in Smith v. Tucker" where the Supreme Court of Tennessee
aplied the doctrine of caveat emptor thus disallowing recovery when based on the grounds of negligence. Not only
did the court deny recovery relying on the doctrine of caveat
emptor but also refused to recognize a cause of action sounding in negligence because the parties lacked privity. This
view was soon to change. The 1916 ease of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.2" marked a shift from the generally accepted rule that no liability existed where there was lack of
privity. Judge Cardozo held an automobile manufacturer
liable for the negligent construction of a defective wheel
which resulted in the personal injury of the ultimate purchaser. The decision avoided the absence of privity of contract by placing a duty of responsibility of care upon the
manufacturer toward the ultimate purchasers when the
foreseeability of harm was evident."
Ten years after the MacPherson decision, the District of
22. 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925).
23. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
24. Id.
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Columbia Appellate Court held that the MacPhersonrule was
not applicable to builders or contractors whose defective
construction caused injury to a person not under a contractual relationship with them. 5 The court further stated
that the contractor's liability ceased with the acceptance of
the completed structure by the owner. In the 1948 case
of Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,2 6 the Third
Circuit rejected this ancient rule of law. By analogy to the
MacPherson decision, the court held that a building contractor was liable to an injured third person not in privity of
contract. The result of the court's decision was to abolish
any distinction between a seller of goods and a building contractor in regard to the duty of care owed to any one who
might foreseeably be endangered by their negligence." The
courts did not apply this new concept again until 1954. At
that time the Supreme Court of Florida held the contractor
of a new home liable for the death of a boy who was struck
by a falling window frame.2 8
Then in 1956, a New York case29 and two District of
Columbia cases" enunciated the rationale and trend of cases
to follow. In the New York case of Inman v. Binghamton
Housing Authority,3 a child was injured when he fell from
the porch of his apartment due to faulty construction. An
action based on the theory of negligence was brought against
the landlord, architect and the builder of the apartment.
Although the court was reversed on appeal because of a defective complaint, the basic rationale of the decision was not
questioned. The court stated that the trend among modern
legal scholars is to expand the MacPherson doctrine, which
dealt only with personal property, to structures erected
upon real property and consequently to abolish any distincFord v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948).
PROSSER, TORTS § 99, at 695 (3d ed. 1964).
Carter v. Livesay Window Co., 73 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1954).
Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 1 App. Div. 2d 559; 152 N.Y.S.
2d 79 (1956).
30. Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 240 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
31. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, supra note 29, at 82-83.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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tion between the two.8" The same year that the Inman3" decision was handed down the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Caporaletti v. A-F Corp.84 expressed
in its opinion the basic reasoning and approach the courts
would follow in order to impose liability upon tract developers, builders and vendors. Judge Holtzoff in his opinion
stated that the ordinary purchaser lacks sufficient familiarity with the complexities of building construction and the
intricacies of applicable regulations and must rely on those
who design, build and sell the house to him."5 Also, in 1956,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Hanna v. Fletcher 6 held the landlord's contractor
liable for injuries to his tenant resulting from negligent repairs. The court analogized MacPherson to the facts of the
case by stating "the tenants were to use the steps, not the
landlord, as in MacPherson the ultimate purchaser was to use
the car, not the dealer." 7 Nine years later, the New Jersey
Court of Appeals held in accord with the current development of the law in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc." that
there is no visible reason for any distinction between the
liability of one who supplies a chattel and one who erects a
structure. The court further stated that "The law should
32. Id. The court stated, "The doctrine announced in the case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co... is pressed upon us. We recognize that if the complaint of the infant against the architects and builder in this case is held
to state a good cause of action we are in effect extending the doctrine of
the MacPherson case, which dealt only with personal property, to structures erected upon real property. . . . The trend of modern legal scholarship appears to sustain the view that no cogent reason exists for continuing the distinction ... "
33. Id.
34. Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., supra note 30, at 16.
35. Id. Judge Holtzoff stated in his opinion: "Conditions have radically
changed since the origin of the general common-law rule. Homes are being
constructed on a large scale by persons engaged in the building business
for the purpose of selling them to individual owners. The ordinary purchaser is not in a position to discover a latent defect by inspection, no
matter how thorough his scrutiny may be, because usually he lacks sufficient familiarity with the complexities of building construction and the
intricacies of applicable regulations. He should be able to rely on the
skill of the builder who sells the house to him. Otherwise he would be at
the vendor's mercy. The realities of modern life necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the builder should be liable for injuries caused by his
negligence under such circumstances, either to the purchaser or to an
invitee. Any other result would be unjust and intolerable. It would encourage unscrupulous builders who may be tempted to reduce their costs
and increase their profits by palming off defective and inferior construction on their customers."
36. Hanna v. Fletcher, supra note 30.
37. Id. at 474.
38. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 322 (1965).
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be based on current concepts of what is right and just and
the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for
keeping its common law principles abreast of the times." 9
The current development of the law has been necessary
and proper to prevent future harm and to curtail the present
evil of negligent practices existing in residential tract developments. The current concept of liability will no doubt
continue to expand to allow recovery for the negligence of
those who have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
conduct of their enterprises. The future direction in court
decisions seems apparent. When a duty exists to protect
those individuals who suffer injury from the acts, conduct or
products of another, liability will be assigned to the negligent
party.
STRICT LIABILITY-A

POSSIBLE BUT

DOUBTFUL REMEDY

The rapid development in the residential home construction enterprise has given rise to various theories of recovery
for the unsophisticated home purchaser. Some of the more
prominent remedial theories upon which the courts have allowed the home purchaser to recover damages are implied
warranties of fitness, covenants and negligence. One theory
of recovery which has come into focus recently but has not
gained much approval by the courts is the doctrine of strict
liability in tort. Although no case has extended the strict
liability doctrine to the sale of real estate,4" the mere fact
that courts have expressed their views on its merits but hold
contrary because of other distinguishing factors might point
toward the future trend in tract development liability.
The doctrine of strict liability has generally been confined to consequences which lie within the extraordinary
risk whose existence calls for special responsibility.41 It
has been recognized in the unwholesome food product area
and similar areas whose defective products would create a
comparable damage to the public. The principle of strict
39. Id. at 325.
40. Connelly v. Bull, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696 (1968).
41. PnossER, ToRTs § 78, at 533 (3d ed. 1964).
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liability in tort as applied to manufacturers was clearly enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.2 Justice Traynor speaking for
the court stated, "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places in the market, knowing that it is
to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being.""
One of the earliest cases to announce and discuss the
principle of strict liability in tort was Schipper v. Lewitt &
Sons,4 4 which involved an action brought by an injured plaintiff against the mass producer of houses. The plaintiff was
the minor son of the lessee. The lessor who had rented the
house to the plaintiff's father had previously purchased the
house from the defendant, a mass producer of houses. The
plaintiff was seriously scalded by water from the hot water
tap resulting from no temperature regulator on the hot
water tank. The evidence concluded that the absence of the
temperature regulator was a result of the defendant's effort
to keep production cost down. Although the opinion stated
that strict liability principles might apply, it went on to
hold that the burden of proof still remains with the plaintiff
to establish to the jury's satisfaction from all the circumstances that the design was unreasonably dangerous and
proximately caused the injury. 5 The court thereby rested
its decision on a negligent theory of liability rather than on
strict liability principles. It would seem that the liability
was being placed on the enterprise sounding in negligence
since the defendant was a mass producer of residential homes.
The New Jersey court continued to apply this same line of
reasoning in the subsequent case of Totten v. Gruzen.46
Although the application of strict liability principles by the
New Jersey Supreme Court seems uncertain, the direction
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1962).
Id.
Schipper v. Levett & Sons, Inc., supra note 38.
Id. at 382.
52 N.J. 202; 245 A.2d 1 (1968). The court not only recognized the negligence principles adopted in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965) with respect to mass housing developers, but also extended
them to include all builders, contractors and architects. The court refused to reach the question whether the doctrine of strict liability applied
in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra was equally applicable to other
situations.
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of development as indicated by other states would allow
one to reasonably conclude that liability will be imposed on
the tract development enterprise sounding in negligence and
not by the application of the strict liability principles.
The California courts flatly rejected the strict liability
doctrine finding no analogy between manufacturers of products and builders of homes. 7 The court rejected the strict
liability theory of recovery by noting three differences between products liability and construction cases.48 The first
difference is that the builders and contractors can seldom
limit their liability by expressed warranties and disclaimers.
The second difference is that the home purchaser has less
difficulty tracing the source of the defect to the builder or
contractor as compared to the average consumer tracing a
defective product to its manufacturer. The final difference
is the distinction in the opportunity to make a meaningful
inspection of retailed products as contrasted with inspection
of a newly purchased residential home.
Two years later the California court had another opportunity to express its opinion on the strict liability question
and its application to tract developments. In Connolley v.
Bull," the First District's Court of Appeals reiterated the
basic reasons for denial of the strict liability doctrine as set
forth in prior cases and continued to stress that the laws governing the sale of commercial products developed along completely different lines than those of property and cannot
be equated. With the advent of the Uniform Commercial
Code which did not treat the subject of express or implied
warranties in contracts for the purchase of real property
47. Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966).
48. Id. at 271. Held; Strict liability has no application as to builders of homes.
The court noted three differences between products liability and construction cases. The first difference was "the builder or contractor is
seldom in a position to limit his liability by express warranties and disclaimers and thereby defeat the recovery of an occupant injured by a
defective building. In the second place, it is considerably less difficult
for the occupant of a building to trace the source of a defect to the builder or the contractor than it is for a consumer to trace the source of a
defect through the modern, complex system of manufacture and assembly
of a product and its distribution through jobbers and retailers. Third,
. . . the most important distinction lies in the opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of the retail product as contrasted with inspection of a
building before using it."
49. Connelly v. Bull, supra note 40.
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but kept its language in terms of buyer-seller and not manufacturer-producer, it would seem that residential home construction liability was left to case law development."0 The
case law development not being in accord with the strict
liability principles governing personal products, the court
thereby rejected the strict liability doctrine and imposed
liability on the real estate developer for damages to the
purchaser's new home based on tort concepts sounding in
negligence.
The only state which has imposed the strict liability
doctrine upon the builder-vendor of a house is Mississippi.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi in State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges,5 imposed strict liability on the manufacturer of a product and to the contractor who builds and
sells a house with the product in it by specifically adopting
§ 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d.2 The action was initiated against the manufacturer of a water heater and the
builder of the house who installed the heater which exploded
and caused the total destruction of the plaintiff's house. The
court dismissed the action as to the manufacturer since if
the heater had been installed by the builder according to the
instructions, the explosion would not have occurred. The
court, however, held that the builder-vendor was liable under
§ 402A since the builder by installing such a product in
homes constructed by them expected it to reach the purchaser in that condition. The court specifically emphasized
50.
51.
52.

Hogan, Commercial Law, SYRACUSE L. REv. 225, 228 (1965).
189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
STRICT LIABILITY
§ 402 A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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that § 402A did not preclude liability when based upon the
alternative ground of negligence of the manufacturer or
vendor-builder. 8
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF LIABILITY

The entire scope of liability of the home construction
enterprise has continued to expand to include more prospective defendants and remedies. Liability has recently
been imposed on a financial lending institution for the negligent construction of a defective home which they instrumental in providing the necessary funds for the tract development."4 The California Supreme Court in Connor v. Great
Western Say. d Loan Ass'n,5 5 applied the MacPherson doctrine to the facts and held the Savings and Loan Association
liable to the home owner as a matter of public policy and law.
Other state courts besides California have based their decisions on public policy considerations such as risk allocation concepts, duty of care and foreseeability of harm concepts and the policy of preventing future harm in the area
of tract developments. There is little doubt in light of current policy considerations and the current status of the law
that a court would not allow a home purchaser to recover
personal or property damages for a defective home which has
recently been constructed or purchased. Some courts have
extended recovery to subsequent purchasers when the defect
is material to the fitness and habitation of the house. There
also seems little justification to impose liability on a mass
developer of residential homes as compared to a single home
builder since the evil the law is attempting to prevent is the
same. The courts will no doubt impose liability on any and
all members who participate in the specific residential home
construction enterprise.
The courts seem very reluctant to extend the doctrine
of strict liability to the mass producer of residential homes.
The trend seems to indicate that liability should be imposed
53. State Stave Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966).
54. Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n., 73 Cal. Rptr. 369; 447 P.2d
609 (1968).
55. Id.
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on all manufacturers, contractors, designers and buildervendors by allowing the unsophisticated home purchaser to
recover on a negligence theory. The liability exerted on the
tract developer should be expressed more in terms of enterprise liability instead of strict liability. That is liability
imposed on those members in the tract development who
actively initiate the project, undertake and assume the risks
and profits of the venture and participate in the undertaking. This enterprise liability facing the tract developer
today is basically threefold. First, the developer, vendorbuilder, contractor or architect can be held liable for completed as well as unfinished homes under an implied warranty theory. Secondly, they can be held liable under expressed covenants. The third and most expanding method
of placing liability on the enterprise are tort concepts sounding in negligence. Under this concept a vendor-builder can
be held directly liable for his negligence and any member of
the enterprise can be held liable to those not in privity by
reason of the MacPhersondoctrine. In essence the doctrine
of strict liability seems inappropriate and premature as to
the manufacturing of a single house or on a large scale basis,
since the home purchaser has appropriate remedies against
the enterprise which would avail the protection and needs of
our society.
CONCLUSION

The unsophisticated home owners and home purchasers
in most states are no longer at the mercy of the unscrupulous
home builders or subject to the archaic property law concepts
imposed by the non-enligthened courts. The home owners
and purchasers have appropriate legal remedies available
whether the injury is personal or to their property. The
courts have placed the liability on the home development enterprise thus providing better protection to the average
home purchaser and allocating the financial risk of loss to
those with deeper pockets. The courts have imposed liability
where liability should be imposed. They have expanded the
concepts of implied warranty, negligence, and duty to exercise reasonable care by the application of the MacPherson
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/20
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doctrine and sound public policy decisions to shift the loss
from the purchaser to the builder of the defectively constructed home. The courts, however, have not gone so far
as to impose strict liability on the developers for their negligent practices in the tract development enterprise. Although all indications are that strict liability will not be imposed on tract developers or manufacturers of homes, it
would appear that the legal concepts and doctrines previously
cited will continue to grow to allow a larger class and number of persons to recover for the negligent acts or products of
others.
ROGER
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